University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary

1997

Counting Heads on RFRA.
Michael Stokes Paulsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Paulsen, Michael Stokes, "Counting Heads on RFRA." (1997). Constitutional Commentary. 760.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/760

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

COUNTING HEADS ON RFRA
Michael Stokes Paulsen*
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide the constitutionality of "RFRA"-the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.l What will they decide? The issue is of great interest and
importance for many reasons (including the fact that I have a
public wager with Professor Chip Lupu on it).z My prediction:
RFRA will be upheld, without a doubt. In fact-though this is
going out on a limb-there is a decent likelihood that RFRA will
be unanimously upheld. To be safe, though, I will predict 7-2 (or
better) for affirmance of the Fifth Circuit's decision upholding
RFRA.
This is not a "should" argument; it is pure nose-counting. (I
also think that RFRA ought to be upheld on the merits, but that
is, in the main, a different question. No one would be foolish
enough to think that just because a particular argument is sound
it will be accepted by the justices, or that the justices' acceptance
of an argument makes it sound.) What follows is a description of
how the justices (probably) will reason, and why they will rule for
RFRA. The analysis is presented in (roughly) the order of most
likely to least likely votes for upholding the statute.
I.

START WITH THE MIDDLE

The constitutionality of RFRA is one of those rare cases that
could make for a strange-bedfellows, both-ends-against-the-middle coalition striking down the statute, on a combination of
grounds each of which is rejected by a firm majority of the Court.
For the uninitiated: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act "restores" the "strict scrutiny" test for government action that im* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I first explored these views with friends and colleagues on the "religionlaw" e-mail chat group,
and have benefitted from the remarks of numerous persons in that format. The views
expressed are, of course, my own. Copyright 1997.
1. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding RFRA against
several constitutional challenges), cert. granted sub nom. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.
Ct. 293 (1996).
2. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and
the U.S. Code, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 249, 293 n.l20 (1995).
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poses a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, even
where the governmental action is facially and formally neutral
with respect to religion. The Supreme Court initially embraced
this test in 1963 as the correct interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause of the Constitution, in the case of Sherbert v. Vemer.3
The Court applied that standard inconsistently for a quarter century, then abandoned it (for the most part) in 1990, in a controversial opinion for the Court authored by Justice Scalia (and
joined by Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Kennedy), in Employment Divison v. Smith.4 RFRA "restores" the Sherbert test as a
matter of federal statutory law-a civil rights statute-and mandates that that test be applied to all governmental action, including state governmental action, that results in a substantial burden
on religious exercise.
The conventional thinking of the RFRA nay-sayers is that
Scalia and the "conservatives" (Rehnquist, Thomas, and maybe
Kennedy) hate both free exercise exemptions (that is, the Sherbert view rejected in Smith) and the so-called "Morgan Power" of
Congress to enact legislation under section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment that goes beyond what the Court has said are the
minimum judicially-enforceable mandates of section one of the
Amendment.s They thus count three sure (Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas) and two probable (Kennedy and O'Connor) votes
against RFRA on this ground, with the remainder to be made up
from the hard left of the Court-Ginsburg and Stevens, and
maybe Breyer-who might tend to think that any discretionary
accommodation of religious exercise violates the Establishment
Clause.
As I explain later, I think that both sets of arguments are
mistaken, as a matter of prognostication. The "conservative"
core of the Smith majority (excluding the since-retired Justice
Byron White) does not consist of religion-haters or Morgan-baiters so much as deferentialists who would prefer to let legislators
draft accommodation statutes. The liberal bloc may fear religious establishment unduly, but probably not so much as to topple RFRA.
Still, the nay-sayers' arguments are not ludicrous, and one
could imagine a public choice nightmare under which three justices vote to strike down RFRA as in excess of Congress' power
3. 374 u.s. 398 (1963).
4. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
5. The" Morgan Power" derives its name from Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), the leading modem case involving interpretation of the scope of Congress' legislative power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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under section five (with six disagreeing with such a view), three
justices vote to strike down RFRA as an Establishment Clause
violation (with six disagreeing), but only three thinking it clears
both hurdles. The holding of the Court becomes the composite
of two different positions each of which is rejected by a (different) solid majority of six. Come to think of it, I've witnessed this
nightmare in real life, more than a couple of times. I was in the
courtroom the day our collective geniuses handed down County
of Allegheny v. ACLU.6 Four justices thought that public seasonal display of either a creche or a menorah was constitutionally
permissible. Three Justices thought that display of either was unconstitutional. 1\vo (Blackmun and O'Connor) thought the
creche was unconstitutional but the menorah wasn't. Thus, the
holding of the Court was the two-justice view, rejected in principle by the seven who thought that different treatment of the two
religious symbols was the one answer that couldn't possibly be
right. Even stranger things have happened.?
In any event, it certainly makes sense to start my nosecounting with the three most solid votes for RFRA-those who
will think it clears both the section five and the Establishment
Clause hurdles. They are (in order) O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, the infamous Casey troika.B
O'Connor's the easy one. She concurred in the judgment
only in Smith, harshly criticizing the majority's abandonment of
the Sherbert test.9 She adhered to this position in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, joining Justice Blackmun's separate concurrence refusing to accept the Smith rule.1o
6. 492 u.s. 573 (1989).
7. Everyone has his particular favorite. The classic example is, of course, National
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The question was whether
the District of Columbia is a "state" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The judgment
of the Court upheld jurisdiction, though every rationale for the judgment was rejected by
a clear majority of justices. Three justices said that the District was not a "state" within
the meaning of the diversity clause of Article III but that Congress had power, under the
seat of government clause of Article I, to create federal jurisdiction anyway. Id. at 583604 (opinion of Jackson, J.). (Six justices disagreed.) Two justices said that the District
could be considered a "state" for purposes of the diversity clause of Article III. Id. at
604-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring). (Seven justices disagreed.) The four dissenters also
split 2-2.
For an argument that such public choice nightmares are inherent in the operation of
a multi-member court, where multiple issues are presented in a single case or where issues
come to the court in an essentially random order, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of
Criticizing the Coun, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 813-31 (1982).
8. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Joint Opinion of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter).
9. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
10. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2250 (1993)
(Biackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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For O'Connor to find RFRA unconstitutional would be almost
inconceivable, as she would have to conclude that it is unconstitutional for Congress to adopt, by statute, under section five, the
same substantive rule that she thinks is required by section one
properly construed. I have seen the argument, advanced most
prominently by Professor Dan Conkle, that the Court should (1)
strike down RFRA; and then (2) overrule Smith.II But this has
never made much sense to me, and I doubt if it would to
O'Connor. On what principled ground can one strike down
RFRA as invalid if it is legislation "enforcing the requirements
of' section one of the Amendment as the justice(s) is (are) now
about to construe that amendment in the next section of the
opinion? The necessary premise of any holding that RFRA exceeds Congress' section five power is that this is not a statute to
"enforce" the provisions of section one because it enforces a rule
that is "bigger" than the actual meaning of the prohibition of section one. For RFRA, that means saying that Congress cannot
pass this statute under its enforcement power because this restricts state power more than Smith does. That necessarily entails
a determination that Smith is rightly decided. A necessary premise of RFRA's invalidity is that it legislates a rule that is inconsistent with (too much "bigger" than) the "correct" constitutional
interpretation of section one. Thus, if the compelling interest test
is the correct reading of the Free Exercise Clause, there can be
no plausible argument that RFRA is unconstitutional. It would
be positively weird for O'Connor (or Souter) to vote to strike
down RFRA and, in the next breath, reiterate that Smith was
wrongly decided and should be overruled in a proper case.
Of course, we will all do seemingly weird things if we think it
is necessary to vindicate some larger principle. A homey example: My four-year-old son is required to ask permission before
going outside to play in the back yard. Once last summer-at
least once-he went out without asking. I brought him in and
placed him in the naughty chair for reiteration of the standing
rule. After I was sure he understood that he needed to ask permission, he proceeded to ask permission, which I gave. My
young formalist gave me a perplexed look and asked why I had
punished him for doing what I was prepared to let him do
anyway.
To vindicate authority, of course (and to enforce the advance-permission rule)! The only plausible argument for
11. Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of An Unconstitutional Statute, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 39 (1995).
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O'Connor invalidating RFRA is precisely this sort of hyper-judicial supremacist opinion, that seeks to vindicate courts' authority
to say what the law is even when they don't disagree with what
the legislature has said it is. There are shades of this in the Joint
Opinion in Casey, but I doubt that any of the Casey three would
go this faoz O'Connor, for one, does not have a hostile reading
of the section five power to begin with, as her opinion in Croson
makes fairly cleaf.l3 Count O'Connor as a solid vote to affirm
the Fifth Circuit's upholding of RFRA, which vindicates
O'Connor's position in Smith.
Count David Souter, too. Souter is also on record, in his
separate concurrence in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah,14 as doubting the correctness of Smith and,
moreover, as saying that principles of stare decisis should not require the Court to adhere to it-an especially significant factor
for the Casey troika. The significance lies in the fact that
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy placed huge reliance on a grand
doctrine of stare decisis in order to justify their votes in Caseyvotes which, for some of them, involved pretty clear flip-flops
from their earlier positions.ls For Souter, the Harvard legal process school protege and the probable moving force behind the
Casey Three's invocation of stare decisis, to say that Smith is
nonetheless fair game, virtually makes it so. At least, it gives the
green light to O'Connor and Kennedy; and, of course, it clearly
signals Souter's willingness to repudiate Smith. (O'Connor, too,
has labored mightily to distinguish Casey's high-church version of
stare decisis in subsequent cases. Her opinion in Adarand Con12. It seems to me quite unlikely that Justice O'Connor would simultaneously (i)
continue to insist that Smith is wrong; and (ii) defer to the majority's contrary view as a
basis for a further holding that RFRA exceeds Congress' power. Again, though, such
madness is not unprecedented. Federal courts/sovereign immunity buffs will recognize
this as Justice White's slightly ludicrous position in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1,
56-57 (1989) (White, J., concurring and dissenting). To paraphrase (and I exaggerate only
slightly): "I don't think that this statute purports to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
but because the majority disagrees with me, I reach the question of whether Congress has
power to do what I think it did not do, and agree that they have such power. Therefore, I
join the judgment that they could and did exercise such power, even though I really think
they could and did not exercise such power." Got that?
13. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.) ("The power to 'enforce' may at times also include the power to define
situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic rules to deal with those situations.") (citing and quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 641 (1%6), with approval).
14. 113 S. Ct. at 2240 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
15. See generally, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, 10 Canst. Comm. 221, 232
(1993) (reviewing Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (1992)).
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structors, Inc., v. Pena,16 overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,11 takes pains to rationalize and reconcile the interment of
Metro with the respect accorded Roe. Interestingly, that portion
of O'Connor's Adarand opinion was joined only by Justice Kennedy.ls Notwithstanding Casey, stare decisis alone surely will not
be enough to keep Souter, or O'Connor-or anyone else for that
matter-from upholding RFRA in the face of Smith.19)
Stare decisis in fact works very strongly in favor of RFRA.
And here is where Anthony Kennedy becomes the clear third
vote to uphold. The Morgan Power accounts for a significant
body of law, and a long series of decisions recognizes it. Consider the following statutes, upheld by the Supreme Court, that
can only be accounted for by Morgan: the nationwide ban on
literacy tests (Oregon v. Mitchell);zo the power of Congress under
section five to abrogate state sovereign immunity principles
(Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer);zl big chunks of the Voting Rights statutes,
including the power to ban at-large districts with racially disparate impact (City of Rome );zz the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act;23 and much, much more. Kennedy vote to overrule all these
cases and strike down these statutes (or call them into doubt with
a significant narrowing of the Morgan power)? It ain't gonna
happen. Put more eloquently, it is fair to observe that asserted
stare decisis interests-reliance, stability, perceptions of judicial
integrity, and the like-should and will attach more strongly to
the Morgan rule than to Smith's seven-year half-life.
Moreover, Kennedy is not all that attached to Smith-and is
clearly not joined-at-the-hip to Scalia. (Their voting alignment
patterns were much different in 1990 than they have been
since.)24 True, Kennedy was part of Scalia's Smith five. But his
16. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
17. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
18. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114-17.
19. For Souter, perhaps even more clearly than for O'Connor, the argument for
simple vindication of judicial power is not reason enough to invalidate a statute that proceeds from correct (to Souter and O'Connor) premises about the meaning of the Free
Exercise Clause.
20. 400 u.s. 112 (1970).
21. 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
22. 446 u.s. 156 (1980).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). Compare Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
24. The Harvard Law Review's annual statistics show Kennedy voting with Scalia in
83.1 %, 85.0%, and 84.1% of the cases in the 1987, 1988, and 1989 Terms (Employment
Division v. Smith being decided during the 1989 Term). After that, the Scalia-Kennedy
axis is weaker: 72.4% (1990 Term), 62.3% (1991 Term-the year of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey), 81.6% (the biggest rebound, for the 1992 Term), 75.9% (1993 Term), 75.3% (1994
Term), 73.4% (1995 Term). In general, Kennedy aligns with Scalia 75% of the time these
days, as opposed to 85% of the time his first three Terms. See the Supreme Court Voting
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opm10n for the Court in Hialeah, while it adheres to Smith,
shows a much more tempered attitude. It is respectful toward
religious liberty and treats harshly government efforts to suppress religion under the guise (a very thin disguise, in Hialeah) of
formal neutrality. The Hialeah case holds, in effect, that government is often not neutral toward religion even when it purports
to adopt facially "neutral" rules. Perhaps more significantly, Hialeah is an example of what hostile government bodies could do
(or attempt to do) to religious exercise, armed with the rule of
Smith-and thus is an example of the type of situation Congress
could look at and conclude that there is a need for a "prophylactic" rule to enforce the core guarantees of religious free exercise.
(There is ample legislative history supporting the view that Congress acted, in whole or in part, out of this concern, as the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Flores makes clear.zs)
In short, Kennedy will be respectful of the Morgan precedent and the results that have followed in its wake; he will be
respectful of the need to protect religious free exercise; he will be
mindful of the limitations of the Smith rule of formal neutrality;
and he will be inclined to defer to legislative accommodations of
free exercise, so long as they do not coerce nonadherents to engage in religious practices. This is more than enough to overcome his vote in Smith (which can readily be distinguished, as I
explain below) and whatever mild doubts he might have about a
broad section five power. Upholding RFRA is the moderate,
sensible, "statesmanlike" thing to do.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit decision under review, Flores v.
City of Boerne,26 is a Patrick Higginbotham opinion. Higginbotham and Kennedy are of similar judicial temperament and styles.
There is much in the Fifth Circuit opinion that is congenial to
Kennedy's approach. Take the name off of the Fifth Circuit
opinion, read it behind a veil of ignorance, and one might have
guessed it was written by Anthony Kennedy. (A side bet: Kennedy will write the opinion for the Court affirming the Fifth Circuit, and it will look a lot like Higginbotham's opinion.)
The middle three are solid for RFRA.

Alignment tables as published in every November issue of the Harvard Law Review beginning with 102 Harv. L. Rev. 351 (1988) and ending with 110 Harv. L. Rev. 368 (19%).
25. Flores, 73 F.3d at 1355-56.
26. 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 19%).
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II. TRY OUT THE LEFT
The remaining votes are less sure things, but Justice Breyer
is probably a solid Vote Number Four for RFRA. Breyer is a
liberal and also something of a legal process proceduralist. To
the extent he has more "conservative" impulses than his other
left-leaning colleagues (Stevens and Ginsburg), those impulses
are in the direction of deference toward established precedent
and deference toward congressional or agency policy. Given this
constellation of attitudes and preferences, it seems highly unlikely that he would vote to overrule or significantly cripple Morgan. Too much good liberal public policy is at stake (i.e., voting
rights); too much precedent would need to be overruled; and it is
too hard to make the argument that RFRA's policy choice for
strict judicial scrutiny is outside the bounds of what the Fourteenth Amendment permits. It is not clear whether Breyer
would embrace the William Brennan/Sherbert v. Verner reading
of the Free Exercise Clause as an original matter, but far be it
from him to say that such an interpretation-advanced by the
courts for a quarter century-is outside the bounds of Congress'
range of choice under section five, especially given the breadth of
discretion Morgan has given Congress.
Some of the same things can be said for Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg. There is no way that Ginsburg votes to overrule, cripple, or significantly restrict Morgan. (If nothing else, she would
feel the need to leave it open for Congress to pass something like
the Freedom of Choice Act ("FOCA"), an early-90's congressinal proposal to entrench and extend Roe v. Wade, in the event
the Court were ever again to come close to overruling the abortion right created in that case.) Breyer is a more solid vote to
uphold RFRA than is Ginsburg, however, for the simple reason
that Breyer has something resembling a sensible understanding
of the Establishment Clause. To be sure, Breyer joined the dissenters in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of
Virginia,z1 but his vote can be explained by the fact that that case
involved funding of religious organizations' religious activities.
The majority held (correctly) that exclusion of a student religious
newspaper from eligibility for funding by a state university (on
the same basis as other student publications) violates the Free
Speech and Free Exercise clauses, and that the Establishment
27. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). For criticism of the dissenters' position, see Michael
Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Un·
constitutional Conditions on "Equal Access" for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 653, 660 n.23 (1996).
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Clause does not authorize such discrimination. The dissenters'
view-that the Establishment Clause's history and purposes
demonstrate a specific intent to bar funding of religious organizations' religious functions-is wrong as an historical and textual
matter, but not so crazy as to be dismissed as lunacy. Mter all,
the Court had embraced exactly such a position as its central animating principle for Establishment Clause adjudication for the
better part of forty years. Breyer may be forgiven for going
along. (If anything, the unwillingness to depart from Warren
Court orthodoxy confirms that Breyer is likely to support

Morgan.)
More telling is that Breyer joined the concurrences in the
judgment in Pinette v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board.zs Pinette involved an Establishment Clause challenge to
the Ku Klux Klan's posting of a cross in the park in front of the
Ohio state capitol. The state had a policy of permitting privatelysponsored displays in the park, which should have made the case
an easy one: the Free Speech Clause does not permit contentbased discrimination against privately-sponsored speech in a
public forum or limited public forum. Discrimination against expression because of its religious nature or elements (though one
chokes at the idea that the Klan's use of the Cross was "religious")29 is no different. The issue in Pinette was whether a religious display-especially an unattended religious display-was
different, because of Establishment Clause concerns about
"message of endorsement." A seven-member majority of the
Court correctly said no, with Justice Scalia writing a categorical
"private speech is private speech" plurality opinion, not-so-subtly
taking issue with the soundness of O'Connor's pet contribution
to the Establishment Clause mess.Jo O'Connor, Souter, and
Breyer concurred in the judgment, preferring to leave the en28. 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2451 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); id. at 2457 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
29. Justice Thomas rightly expressed horror at this sacrilege, but recognized that the
religious content of the cross was the only premise under which the proposed censorship
was sought to be justified before the Court, and joined the Court in rejecting that premise. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2450-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
30. The "message of endorsement" inquiry originated in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The test
has had a checkered history, at times appearing to gain the support of a majority of the
~ourt, cf. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985), yet now appearmg to have been abandoned as doctrine even by Justice O'Connor herself. See Board of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2495, 2499 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For criticism of the
text, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 266 (1987).
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dorsement question open and noting that, in any event, a mistaken message of endorsement could be corrected through
means less restrictive of free expression than a content-based discrimination against religious expression in a public forum (disclaimers, for example).
The concern about Ginsburg is that she actually dissented
(along with Stevens) in Pinette, preferring to suppress religious
expression than to tolerate it on an equal basis. Moreover, in
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District,31 Ginsburg joined the Stevens position that it is unconstitutional (or at
least constitutionally suspect) to allow members of the same faith
to serve together on a politically elected school board, though
she was not alone in this grievous mistake-in fact, it appears
that a majority of the Court accepted this proposition.32
Again, however, even if Ginsburg is generally separationist
in her instincts, that does not necessarily bode ill for RFRA. It
was, after all, the liberal icon William Brennan who was the
champion of Sherbert. He somehow managed to maintain this
position notwithstanding his strict separationist view of the Establishment Clause, perhaps by keeping the two positions in separate analytical boxes. For Brennan (and it could be that
Ginsburg's position will end up replicating Brennan's), protecting private free exercise, through the device of exemptions from
laws of general applicability that nonetheless uniquely burden a
religious adherent's individual conduct, is hugely different from
anything having to do with (i) direct government funding benefiting religion; and (ii) public religious displays. Rosenberger and
Pinette, even if wrong, are clearly distinguishable. Kiryas Joel is
too: it was a sect-specific accommodation involving a religionconscious political gerrymander, decided in the wake of the
Court's invalidation of racial gerrymanders in Shaw v. Reno.33
RFRA is an across-the-board restoration of a religion-sympathetic test. Only if one thinks that any voluntary accommodation
of religion by government violates the Establishment Clause is
there cause for concern about RFRA on establishment grounds.
I doubt that Justice Ginsburg will find RFRA's core test-William Brennan's old Sherbert test-to violate the Establishment
31. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
32. The law at issue was deemed to be a delegation of governmental authority to a
religious group, because all the school board members were members of the Satmar sect
and because the school district boundaries coincided with those of a village drawn along
religious lines. Id. at 2488-90 (plurality opinion); id. at 2503-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment).
33. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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Clause as an overbroad accommodation of religion. In fact, its
very breadth helps. The fact that RFRA is a truly general and
reliably neutral accommodation statute, rather than a here's-onefor-the-Satmar statute, is sufficient to distinguish her Kiryas Joel
position.
Moreover, the fact that Flores is basically positioned as
presenting a question of the facial constitutionality of RFRA
makes it much harder to muster an Establishment Clause argument against it in this case. If Flores were a prisoner case involving a born again Christian fundamentalist demanding the right to
evangelize his fellow prisoners, or a claim by Sikhs that their children must be permitted to wear ceremonial religious knives to
school (in the face of a flat no-weapons rule ),34 I would be more
worried about Ginsburg. But even if the grant of certiorari required consideration of the application of RFRA to the facts in
Flores (which it does not), it is hard to see how allowing a Catholic church to enlarge its sanctuary (notwithstanding a facially
"neutral" landmarking statute) is a preferential accommodation
of the sort deemed uniquely suspect in Kiryas Joel. I doubt that
even Justice Ginsburg will think that RFRA is unconstitutional
on its face or in any but its most extreme (and probably erroneous) applications. That's Vote Five.
The real concern would be that Ginsburg may have aligned
herself with Justice John Paul Stevens on religion cases-Kiryas
Joel in 1994 and both Rosenberger and Pinette in 1995. Stevens,
of course, is implacably hostile to religion, in a way that seems to
go beyond jurisprudence. Religion always loses on the Establishment Clause side, on a strict separationist protection-of-secularsociety-from-religion view. And religion always loses on the Free
Exercise side, on a what-a-mess-this-gets-us-into-and-whatmakes-religion-so-special-anyway view.3s Stevens even thinks
that the existence of religious motivations for enacting a law
should be sufficient reason for invalidating it.36 There seems to
be more to Stevens' consistently anti-religion opinions than a
particular view of the Establishment Clause combined with a particular view of the Free Exercise Clause; rather, there is evidence
that Stevens simply thinks religion is narrow-minded, suspicious,
a troubling way for people to view the world (if not affirmatively
stupid and dangerous), and certainly not something to be accom34. The latter is an actual case. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510-13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,560-72 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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modated. This made Stevens a strange fifth vote for Smith, because the others in the majority (Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and
Kennedy) had always been consistent accommodationists on the
Establishment Clause side of things.
The tendency is to think that Stevens will certainly vote
thumbs-down on RFRA. But Stevens is no opponent of the
Morgan Power. What will he do? It is hard to say, and I would
never bet the ranch on Stevens' favorable vote in any case involving religion. Still, it is not inconceivable that he could vote to
uphold RFRA, on the theory that Congress has sufficient latitude under section five even to do things that are manifestly stupid, like accommodate religion in ways not required by the Free
Exercise Clause. The fact that RFRA explicitly defines "religion" to mean whatever it means in the First Amendment, and
specifically notes that RFRA leaves the Establishment Clause
unaffected (as if Congress could trump the Establishment Clause
if it chose to), makes it hard for even as determined an anti-accommodationist as Stevens to find RFRA to be an establishment
of religion on its face. But I wouldn't put it past him.
As we leave the center and left and look right, I count 3
solid votes for RFRA, one near-solid (Breyer), and one probable
(Ginsburg), for a 5-1 lean. Still, that five is not firm. Could Stevens and Ginsburg lead the three solid conservatives into an unholy alliance to strike down RFRA?
III. WHY THE RIGHT WILL GET RFRA RIGHT
Are you ready for the surprise? Remember, you heard it
here first: Justice Antonin Scalia, the unrepentant author of
Smith, will vote to uphold the constitutionality of RFRA. In fact,
he may turn out to be one of the strongest votes to uphold
RFRA. The reasons can be found in a careful reading of Smith
itself and in Scalia's general jurisprudence.
First, Smith is a deference-to-the-legislature opinion. Scalia
does not argue that the mandatory exemptions view is beyond
the pale of plausible interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause.
Scalia's argument is, instead, a somewhat more nuanced one:
As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given
that meaning. . . . It is a permissible reading of the text ... to
say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the
object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a gener-
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ally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First
Amendment has not been offended.37

To be sure, Scalia notes (surely disingenuously) that "[o]ur
decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct one,"3s but
he goes on to invite legislatively-granted religious exemptions
from laws of general applicability:
Values that are protected against government interference
through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby
banished from the political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the
Hrst Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that
believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief
can be expected to be solicitious of that value in its legislation
as well. . .. But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not
to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the
courts.39

Smith, for Scalia, fundamentally rests on the principle that
the mandatory-exemptions view is too strong a reading of the
ambiguous language of the Free Exercise Clause for judges to
adopt and apply on their own as a basis for invalidating state and
federal statutes duly adopted by democratic bodies. Moreover,
the judicially-created "compelling interest" escape hatch to the
judicially-embraced strong reading of the clause has a hydraulic
tendency, in free exercise cases, to degenerate into pure judicial
ad hoc balancing of the importance of government policies
against the importance of religious beliefs to their adherentsthe worst of all worlds both because of the Great Satan (for
Scalia) of balancing tests generally and because the idea of
judges weighing the importance of· religious beliefs should be
anathema to serious religious adherents (like Scalia).
But if the legislature wants to impose such a policy, wholesale or retail, Scalia will let it do so. (We'll get to the federalversus-state-legislature issue in a moment.) Even if it's a dumb
idea to have balancing tests, and even if the dumb balancing test
adopted by RFRA parallels the Court's huge mistake in the
Sherbert line, the legislature, in Scalia's world, can adopt
whatever foolish policies it likes as long as the policy falls within
37.
38.
39.

Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (emphasis added).
Id.
ld. at 890.
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the range of the legislature's constitutional authority to legislate.
The task of the judge, assuming a foolish statute is constitutional,
is to enforce those foolish legislative policies to the letter, yea, to
enforce them with a vengeance. (Watch for Scalia to become the
most agressive enforcer on the Court of an un-watered-down
compelling interest test under RFRA, even when-and perhaps
especially when-it requires the courts to reach seemingly perverse results. "If Congress wants to pass a stupid law, by golly
we're going to let them, and we're sure not going to save them
from their own stupidity.")4o
For Scalia, the whole issue is whether RFRA is within the
scope of Congress' authority to legislate. And that is an entirely
different question from the authority of the courts to create judicial balancing tests out of an ambiguous text. Congress may have
the power to rush in where the courts should fear to tread. Indeed, I would not be terribly surprised if Scalia wrote the Opinion of the Court (or at least a concurrence) that said (in essence):
See? I was right. Smith was rightly decided and the democratic process is free to grant legislative accommodations, just
like I said. RFRA is such a statute. And all of those academic critics who belittled my argument that the legislature
could protect Bill of Rights freedoms have been proved
wrong.

We're not quite home free with Scalia, though. There is still
the question of whether RFRA is an appropriate accommodation
statute for Congress to pass and impose on the states. Now,
some observers think that Scalia will reject RFRA as contrary to
separation-of-powers, and cite Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms41 as an illustration. But Scalia would
never make such a sloppy analytical mistake. RFRA, in form
(and form matters to a formalist), creates a statutory right where
there used to be a constitutional right; it does not "overrule" a
constitutional holding of the Supreme Court or (as in Plaut) legislatively reopen final judicial judgments of dismissal on the merits. Scalia, a good formalist, will recognize that there is
absolutely no separation of powers problem in Congress adopting as its statutory standard a now-discarded judicial constitutional test. Nor does the fact that Congress, in its "findings"
section, criticized Smith transform an otherwise constitutional
statute into an improper attempt to "dictate" constitutional law
40. Compare Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
616, 631 (1949) (Opinion of Keen, J.).
41. 115 s. Ct. 1447 (1995).
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to the judiciary. RFRA dictates statutory law to the judiciary,
which is what Congress does.
The proper question is federalism. Which legislature has authority in this area? Does Congress' section five enforcement
power permit it to legislate restrictions on state government that
go beyond what section one of its own force gives the judiciary
power to impose on its own? My intuition is that Scalia, despite
reservations about the Court's prior reasoning in cases like Morgan and Oregon v. Mitchell, would not vote to overrule those
cases-not because Scalia is unwilling to tear down doctrine he
thinks wrong, but because RFRA, at least, can be seen as consistent with a fair construction of the proper scope of the section
five power. If anything, RFRA is far easier to sustain under the
Morgan power-in either its "remedial" or "substantive" variants-than were the statutes at issue in Morgan and Oregon v.
Mitchell themselves. It is far less of a stretch to find that Congress may enforce the Free Exercise Clause by enacting legislation banning laws that impose substantial burdens on free
exercise that are not justified by compelling governmental purposes than to find (for example) that a ban on English literacy
tests is a "remedy" for denial of equal protection rights to government services.42 Scalia, to the extent resistant to Morgan,
might even find Flores an occasion for damage control.
All of the arguments why RFRA is constitutional under any
reading of the Morgan line, broad or narrow, are fully set forth in
the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion in Flores. To strike
down RFRA, Scalia has to launch a jihad against Morgan. He
doesn't have the votes (three, maybe four max) and there's no
point in attempting to overthrow the existing regime if you're
going to fall short-ali that gets you is a six vote reaffirmation of
Morgan and a result that invalidates RFRA because one or two
zanies think it violates the Establishment Clause for government
ever to accommodate religion. That is not a result Scalia wants.
Besides, it is not even clear to me that Scalia is a committed
opponent of Morgan, or that he should be. A strong formalist,
textualist, originalist case can be made that Morgan is correct on
the theory that the Fourteenth Amendment's indeterminate constitutional language permits Congress to legislate, pursuant to
section five, any rule not demonstrably inconsistent with the necessary meaning of section one (including an "incorporated" Free
Exercise Clause). The same indeterminate language should
mean that, in the absence of congressional action, the courts may
42.

See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53.
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not strike down state legislative enactments unless they are demonstrably inconsistent with the necessary meaning of the text:
thus the result in Smith. In short, there is a principled approach
to Morgan-I might even venture to say the correct approachthat would permit Scalia to say (in effect): "Smith was right, Morgan was right, RFRA is all right, and I am always right."
That may be overstating things a bit, but it does turn on its
head Scalia's critics' armchair psychoanalytical nonsense that
Scalia will vote against RFRA because it is a slap in the face to
his opinion in Smith. To the contrary, the habits of mind and
characteristics of temperament that make Scalia so, well, Scalialike are more likely to produce a bold, brilliant opinion explaining how Smith and RFRA can both be right. At any rate, tearing
down Morgan does not appear to be one of Scalia's pet projects.
The theory that Scalia is so committed to the anti-exemptions
view of Smith that he will try to take down Morgan seems to rest
on an overreacting of Smith as hostile to religious liberty. In fact,
however, Smith is hostile only to judicially-created balancing
tests that rest on tendentious readings of ambiguous textual provisions, and that deploy such tests to upset democratic policy
choices. Morgan and RFRA can (on this reading) be upheld in a
way that vindicates and reaffirms this central principle of Scalia's
jurisprudence. At least that's how I'm betting.
As goes Scalia, so goes Thomas. Or at least so goes the saying. With regard to RFRA, though, I think it's more accurate to
say that if Scalia is a yes vote for RFRA, Thomas is a fortiori a
yes vote for RFRA. The above line of reasoning, even if it
doesn't persuade Scalia, should. For Scalia to reject RFRA
would confirm the view that he is intensely committed to the noexemptions view of Smith, and that this prevails over his general
jurisprudential philosophy. Thomas, however, shares the same
general jurisprudential philosophy as Scalia but is probably only
weakly committed to Smith, if that. He became the sixth vote for
Smith in Hialeah, but that does not necessarily signal strong
agreement so much as acquiescence in a majority precedent, rejection of which was not necessary to reach the result in Hialeah.
It is entirely possible that Thomas joined the majority opinion in
Hialeah because it really was not a Smith-type statute, meaning
that the Smith question really was not presented. And, as noted.
even agreement with Smith does not necessarily imply rejection
of RFRA.

1997]

COUNTING HEADS ON RFRA

23

Thomas's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission 43 in 1994, seems a moderately strong signal of support for RFRA. Swanner presented a
RFRA challenge to application of a marital status discrimination
lawsuit against a landlord acting pursuant to sincere religious
convictions. The decision below was adverse to the religious
landlord, and Thomas suggested that review was appropriate in
part because of the confusion of lower courts over the interpretation of RFRA and in part because Thomas was "quite skeptical"
that Alaska's asserted interest would satisfy the "stringent standards" of RFRA.44 Thomas, too, thinks an anti-accommodation
reading of the religion clauses is nonsense. All of which leads me
to think that Thomas will vote to uphold RFRA.
That brings the pro-RFRA count to seven. Will the Chief
make it eight? On the face of it, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
is the least likely vote for RFRA, if the criterion is prior opinions
on similar legal issues. Rehnquist has consistently-early and
often-opposed the pro-exemptions reading of the Free Exercise
Clause. His lone dissent in Thomas v. Review Board, in 1981,
charted the intellectual territory that led to the gradual acceptance of essentially the same view by a majority of the Court in
199(}.45 There is nothing in Smith (except for unpersuasive distinguishing of prior precedents) that Rehnquist hadn't already said,
better, in dissent in Thomas. Rehnquist has also been a consistent Morgan-resister. He dissented in City of Rome.46 He is a
largely consistent pro-government, pro-state power conservative,
who has never met a Free Exercise Clause claim he really likes or
an exercise of the section five power that he thought didn't intrude on state or local governmental prerogatives. He is a consistent pro-state power federalist, as illustrated by his majority
opinions in National League of Cities and United States v.
Lopez.47
But Rehnquist has never been hobgoblined by a foolish consistency. He also, in recent years, has displayed a growing fondness for the swift, simple, cut-to-the-chase, don't-write-too-much,
paper-over-the-differences, we-can-always-fix-it -later opinion.
(Perhaps he misses Justice White a bit: Now there was a Justice
who could crank out opinions in a quick, no-nonsense fashion!
43. 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
44. Id. at 461.
45. Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. 446 U.S. 156, 206 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. National League of Ciities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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And if the opinion didn't make entire sense out of an issue, or
wrestle with the hard questions presented by the Court's resolution, tough.) I can easily see Rehnquist writing the opinionbrief, curt, near-unanimous, brushing aside the objections to
RFRA with dispatch that says less than O'Connor and Souter
would like about protection of the constitutional right of free
religious exercise, less about how important and sensitive the
Court is than Kennedy might prefer, less about the proper theory
of Morgan than Scalia and Thomas might like, and, in general,
that doesn't say much of anything terribly interesting at all (or
that says some very interesting things in a rather casual manner).
I envision an opinion that resembles in tone, length, and style
(and in unanimity or near-unanimity) Rehnquist's opinions for
the Court in Hustler v. Falwe/l48 and Wisconsin v. Mitche/149: simple, straightforward, clear (so far as it goes), unambitious, not
attempting a comprehensive review and clean-up of the law. It
might simply apply "our precedents" without embracing them
(and perhaps with a nudge toward reading them narrowly), leaving everyone happy (or unhappy) to fight their little doctrinal
battles another day. But the opinion would at least resolve the
question of RFRA's constitutionality so that we can move on
with life. (Besides, we can always "fix" RFRA by reading the
compelling interest test in a pro-government manner whenever
we really want to, as the pre-Smith experience proved.so)
That's eight votes, even putting Justice Stevens to one side
(where he belongs) as either hopeless or hopelessly unpredictable. I can be wrong on one of the eight (and experience shows
that I'll probably have missed the mark on at least one) and still
make my 7-2 line. That gives me two justices to spare before I
lose my wager with Professor Lupu, which was after all not on
the exact head count but on whether RFRA would be upheld in
the first Supreme Court case squarely addressing and resolving
the issue. RFRA will be upheld.
The timing of this issue of Constitutional Commentary
should be such that this prediction will be published before the
Court's opinion in Flores is handed down (which, of course,
won't be until the last two or three weeks of the Term, along with
Bill Clinton v. Paula Jones and the other "biggies" of the Term).
My editors have chained me to the mast of my pre-page proof
predictions. So my prediction is just hanging out there for all to
48. 485 u.s. 46 (1988).
49. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
50. See generally Paulsen, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 249 (cited in note 2).
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see. If wrong, I will suffer the ignominy of my own publicly-displayed incompetence. If so, please, Chip, just try not to gloat too
much.

